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Appellants

American

Motors

Sales

Corporation

and

Jeep

Corporation ("AMC/Jeep") respectfully submit the following response
to the arguments presented by Appellee Stephen Whitehead in his
Petition for Rehearing.
INTRODUCTION
In appealing this case to the Utah Supreme Court, AMC/Jeep
sought reversal of the trial court's judgment on the grounds that
the trial court made incorrect and prejudicial rulings on questions
of law and with respect to the admissibility of certain evidence.
In an opinion filed February 2, 1989, this Court agreed, in
part,

holding

that

the trial

court

erred:

(1) in

limiting

AMC/Jeep7s cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert witnesses (Slip
Op. at 7) ; and (2) in excluding significant portions of AMC/Jeep's
evidence (Slip Op. at 7-11).

The Court then concluded as follows:

Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that
error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the
party is affected. In the instant case, the trial court
erroneously excluded evidence offered by defendants.
That evidence was necessary to rebut the assertions that
plaintiffs made to establish liability. This error was
compounded by unduly restricting the scope of defendants'
cross-examination.
Given the conflicting testimony
presented on this key issue, we cannot say that the
substantial rights of defendants were not affected by the
combined effects of the erroneous exclusion of the
evidence and the limitation of cross-examination. While
no one error by itself perhaps mandates reversal, the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our
confidence that defendants were able to present to the
jury their theory of the case and that a fair trial was
had.
We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.
Slip Op. at 12.
<
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Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing now contends that this
Court erred in its decision on the appeal:
improper

standard

of

review; and

(1) by applying an

(2) by misunderstanding

factual context of the trial court's rulings.

the

Plaintiff asks that

the Court consider new arguments, raised for the first time in its
Petition for Rehearing, and change its decision based upon this new
brief.

In the alternative, plaintiff asks the Court for the first

time to limit reversal to the liability issue only, directing that
the damage award be held in abeyance and accrue interest pending
retrial of the liability issue. The focus of Plaintiff's Petition,
however, is the contention that this Court has assembled a few
isolated, insubstantial and nonprejudicial errors and improperly
held that the cumulative effect thereof mandates reversal.
In fact, this Court:
(a) clearly articulated the standard found in Rule 103
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, that error may not be predicated
upon

a

ruling

which

admits

or

excludes

evidence

unless

a

substantial right of the party is affected;
(b) determined that the trial court "erroneously excluded
evidence offered by defendants which was necessary to rebut the
assertions

that

plaintiffs

made

compounded

its

error

unduly

"by

to

establish
restricting

liability/,
the

scope

and
of

defendants' cross-examination"; and
(c) properly held that "[g]iven the conflicting testimony
presented on this key issue. we cannot say that the substantial
rights of defendants were not affected by the combined effects of
2
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the erroneous exclusion of the evidence and the limitation of
cross-examination",.,

and

that

"the

cumulative

effect

of

the

several errors undermines our confidence that defendants were able
to present to the jury their theory of the case and that a fair
trial was had".
Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing should be denied.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE ERRONEOUS EXCLUSION OF
EVIDENCE OFFERED BY AMC/JEEP TO REBUT PLAINTIFF'S THEORY
OF LIABILITY AND THE IMPROPER RESTRICTION OF THE SCOPE
OF AMC/JEEP'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT
WITNESSES COMBINED TO REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION IN THIS CASE
In the case of Ivie v. Richardson, 336 P. 2d 781, 787 (Utah
1959) , this Court reversed and remanded a personal injury case for
new trial based upon the cumulative effect of several trial court
errors, stating:
It is unnecessary and would serve no useful purpose
for us to decide whether any one of the errors above
discussed, considered
separately, would
constitute
sufficient prejudicial error to require a new trial. The
question is whether the case was presented to the jury
in such a manner that it is reasonable to believe there
was a fair and impartial analysis of the evidence and a
just verdict. If errors were committed which prevented
this being done, then a new trial should be granted,
whether it resulted from one error, or from several
errors cumulatively.
We expressly do not mean to say
that trivia which would be innocuous in themselves can
be added together to make sufficient error to result in
prejudice and reversal.
The errors must be real and
substantial and such as may reasonably be supposed would
affect the result.
However, errors of the latter
character, which may not by themselves justify a
reversal, may well, when considered together with others,
render it clear that a fair trial was not had. In such
event justice can only be served by the granting of a new
3
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trial, absent
ordered,..

the

errors

complained

of*

It

is

so

Similarly, in State v. St. Clair, 282 P.2d 323 (Utah 1955),
the Court stated:
None of the rulings on evidence, considered singly,
may seem of any great import.
But the defendant is
nevertheless
entitled
to
have
them
considered
cumulatively and as part of the over-all picture in
determining whether he had a fair opportunity to present
his defense.
Id. at 328; and
The proposition for us to decide here is not whether
any of the irregularities herein discussed would
separately have been such as to constitute prejudicial
error and require a new trial. It is recognized that a
combination of errors which, when singly considered might
be thought insufficient to warrant a reversal, might in
their cumulative effect do so.
Id. at 332; Accord Moss v. Magnetic Peripherals, Inc., 744 P.2d
1285, 1288 (Okla. App. 1987).
Plaintiff's argument that the Court's decision in this case
"adopts a 'cumulative error doctrine' and overrules, sub silentio#
prior

decisions

of

this

Court

to

the

contrary,"

is

simply

inaccurate. The case of Bundv v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988),
on which plaintiff principally relies for its argument, merely held
that the cumulative error standard did not apply in that case
because there were no substantial errors. Id. at 806.
expressly

recognized, however, the existence

of a

The Court
"cumulative

error" doctrine in cases where a number of errors prejudice the
defendant's right to a fair trial.

Id.

Similarly, in Lamb v.

Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974), cited by plaintiff, the
Court merely found that the errors were insubstantial.
4
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The holdings in Richlin v. Gooding Amusement Co. , 113 Ohio
App. 99, 170 N.E.2d 505, 508 (1960) and Nicholas v. Yellow Cab Co. ,
116 Ohio App. 402, 180 N.E.2d 279, 286 (1962), cited by plaintiff,
are

distinguishable

from

the

present

case

in

that

they

are

predicated on the fact that the various errors complained of were
unrelated to one another.
706, 177 S.E.2d 70, 72-73

Hess Oil & Chem. Corp. v. Nash, 22 6 Ga.
(1970), which relies on the Nicholas

holding, is further distinguishable in that the appellant did not
specify cumulative error as a basis for reversal.
In this case, the Court properly held that:
1.

after permitting

plaintiffs

to present,

through

their expert witnesses, a theory of liability that the accident
vehicle (a Jeep Commando) was defective and unreasonably dangerous
because:
(a)

it was purportedly "substantially similar" to
the CJ-5; and

(b)

the CJ-5 was purportedly defective because
certain tests purportedly showed that the
CJ-5 was more likely to roll over than other
vehicles, including passenger cars;

2.

the trial court then erroneously:
(a)

cut defendants off during their attempts to
cross-examine plaintiff's experts, preventing
defendants from probing the basis of the
opinions given by plaintiff's experts on
comparisons they had made in their direct
5
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examination, allowing the issues to be
presented to the jury without the added light
that thorough cross-examination sheds (Slip
Op. at 6-7); and
.(b)

excluded defendants' own expert testimony and
exhibits to rebut the plaintiff's theory of
liability (Slip Op. at 9-10).

The Court specifically observed as follows:
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced films of
Jeep CJ-5s rolling. In part I of this opinion, we upheld
the admissibility of those films because of the
[purported] substantial similarity of the vehicle shown
in the films to the vehicle in which plaintiffs were
injured. However, plaintiffs in presenting their case
did not stop there. They produced several experts who
repeatedly in their testimony drew comparisons of the
rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles to non-Jeep
vehicles. Plaintiffs' aim was to show that the Jeep in
which they were riding was of an unsafe design and had
a tendency to roll much easier than other vehicles. For
example, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Shaw, testified: "There
is no doubt that this vehicle is much more prone to roll
over than some others." Likewise, plaintiffs' expert,
Mr. Noettl, testified that "it was very difficult to turn
a passenger car over." Finally, Mr. Anderson, another
of plaintiffs' experts, testified that Jeep vehicles have
"a delay in the handling response" that is greater than
S10 Blazers and Chevy Chevettes. Under the rule of law
relied upon by the dissenting opinion, that evidence of
the condition of other products is not admissible to
establish a defect in a particular product, it may be
questioned whether such comparisons should have been
admitted because of the lack of similarity.
However,
right or wrong, plaintiffs' experts were allowed to draw
the comparisons between the rollover propensities of Jeep
and non-Jeep vehicles. Certainly then, defendants should
have been allowed in rebuttal to prove the experience of
plaintiffs' experts and to introduce into evidence the
film showing non-Jeep vehicles doing mechanically induced
rollovers similar to those shown in plaintiffs' film...
Slip Op. at 9-10.

6
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Similarly, the Court properly held that:
1.

After receiving expert testimony presented by the

plaintiff that the accident vehicle was defective at the time it
left the hands of the manufacturer because its roof collapsed
during the rollover made the subject of this litigation, thus
contributing to the plaintiff's injuries;
2.

The trial court erroneously sustained plaintiff's

objection (on the basis of materiality) to the admissibility of an
exhibit offered by defendants to show that the accident vehicle had
been

involved

in

a

prior

accident

that

structural integrity of the vehicle's roof.

had

compromised

the

Slip Op. at 10.

Finally, the Court properly held that evidence of how the
presence of seat belts affected the design safety of the vehicle
was erroneously excluded under the circumstances of this case.
Slip Op. at 11.
Contrary
Rehearing,

to

the

plaintiff's

aforesaid

contention

errors

do

not

insubstantial and nonprejudicial errors.

in

its

Petition

constitute

for

isolated,

Indeed, as this Court

properly held:
Given the conflicting testimony presented on this key
issue, we cannot say that the substantial rights of
defendants were not affected by the combined effects of
the erroneous exclusion of the evidence and the
limitation of cross-examination. While no one error by
itself perhaps mandates reversal, the cumulative effect
of the several errors undermines our confidence that
defendants were able to present to the jury their theory
of the case and that a fair trial was had.
Slip Op. at 12.

7
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POINT II
AMC/JEEP CAREFULLY PRESERVED ITS CLAIMS OF ERROR ARISING
OUT OF THE EXCLUSION OF ITS EVIDENCE THROUGH PROFFERS
REFLECTED IN THE RECORD DESIGNATED IN THIS CASE
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "[e]rror
may not be predicated

upon a ruling which...excludes

evidence

unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and... the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or
was apparent from the context within which questions were asked".
In this case, AMC/Jeep carefully preserved its claims of error
arising out of the exclusion of its evidence, through proffers
reflected in the record designated on this appeal, and obviously
reviewed by the Court in connection with its consideration of this
appeal.

See e.g., Slip Opinion at 7-11.
POINT III

THIS COURT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL
COURT'S RULINGS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF DEFENDANTS7
EXHIBITS AND PROPERLY HELD THAT THOSE DETERMINATIONS WERE
ERRONEOUS
For the third time on this appeal, Plaintiff has argued to
this Court that the trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings
were actually "sanctions imposed by the trial court as a result of
AMC/Jeep's failure to make discovery."

(Resp. Br. at 11; Motion

for Summary Disposition; Petition for Rehearing at 9-17) . AMC/Jeep
responded to those arguments twice prior to the issuance of the
Courts opinion in this case (See Reply Br. at 4-18; Appellants7
Response to Motion for Summary

Disposition), and this

Court's

opinion demonstrates on its face that those arguments have been

8
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carefully

reviewed,

thoroughly

understood,

and

thoughtfully

considered.
Specifically, the Court states in its opinion as follows:
Defendants also contend that the trial court erred
in excluding certain films and exhibits offered by them
as evidence. They called a Mr. Heitzman as an expert
witness to testify regarding the handling characteristics
of Jeep vehicles.
He offered a film showing CJ-5s
successfully negotiating emergency maneuvers. Plaintiffs
objected on the ground that the introduction of the film
violated previous orders of the court
regarding
discovery. The objection was sustained.
Plaintiffs had submitted interrogatories seeking any
testing
Jeep
had
done
regarding
the
handling
characteristics of the 1966-73 Jeep Commando.
At a
hearing on plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery. Judge
Sorenson ordered Jeep to respond to the interrogatory
within thirty days. At trial, after hearing arguments
in chambers on the admissibility of the film, the court
ruled:
I think that in the context of all the
circumstances and with respect to discovery
procedures...I think the plaintiffs
were
entitled to have, or see, the films and test
results before
trial pursuant to
their
discovery interrogatories. . . , the films are not
admissible.
The trial court can exclude evidence that violates
discovery <Drders under rule 37 o f the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
However , defendants point out that the
discovery covered on ly tests of the 1966--73 Jeep
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep <
CJ-5. The film
simply is; not covered by the
lanquaqe of the
interrogatory. Although plaintiffs7 experts were allowed
at trial, over objections of defendants, to show films
of CJ-5s based on their foundational testimony that its
handling was substantially similar to that of the
Commando, that ruling does not place the film within the
scope of material sought in the pretrial discovery
request. The dissenting opinion would have defendants
divine the scope of the requests by a trial court ruling
on the admissibility of evidence which came much later.
This burden cannot fairly be placed on them. The tests
were not produced to show the handling of the "66-73 Jeep
Commando," nor were they offered for that purpose.
Defendants maintained that the handling of the CJ-5 and
9
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the Commando were not the same. The tests were offered
to rebut evidence presented by plaintiffs that the CJ-5
was defective because of its handling characteristics.
Although this evidence could have been excluded on the
basis of relevancy had the trial court earlier excluded
plaintiffs' films, once the court allowed plaintiffs to
try their case on the basis of comparison with the CJ-5,
it could not then refuse defendants the opportunity to
rebut assertions made by plaintiffs in the presentation
of their case. The trial court erred in excluding the
film on the basis that defendants had failed to comply
with orders regarding discovery.
Slip Op. at 7-8.
This Court held that the trial court's exclusion of Heitzman's
second film on the basis of relevance was also error (Slip Op. at
8-10), but sustained the ruling of the trial court with respect to
Exhibit No. 174, stating:
The third film that defendants claim was wrongfully
excluded was offered as exhibit No. 174, a video produced
by defendants7 expert, Dr. Warner. It consisted of two
parts...The second part was excluded because the test was
not made until after the trial had commenced, in
violation of pretrial orders regarding discovery.
Counsel for defendants stated that No. 174 was offered
to show the handling characteristics of the 1972
Commando.
Clearly, it came within the scope of
plaintiffs7 interrogatories and was properly excluded for
failure to respond to discovery.
Plaintiffs nevertheless have petitioned this Court for leave
to

reargue

the

entire

matter

again, this

time

arguments never before presented on this appeal.
Rehearing at 9-17.

asserting

new

Petition for

In Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P. 2d 678, 681

(Utah 1982) this Court denied a petition for rehearing asserting
new arguments, unequivocally stating that "fal losing party cannot
use a petition for rehearing 'to present to this court a new theory
or contention which was neither in the record as it was before this

10
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court nor in the arguments made 7 ", citing Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah
485, 498, 170 P. 774, 778 (1918).

That ruling is applicable here.

AMC/Jeep responded fully, or properly objected, to all of
plaintiff's discovery requests in this litigation.

Plaintiff's

discovery did not request from AMC/Jeep information relating to the
demonstrative evidence erroneously excluded by the trial court,
except in the case of rebuttal evidence created during the course
of

the

trial

and

excluded

Plaintiffs prior to trial.

because

it was

not

produced

for

Furthermore, the Plaintiff never moved

the trial court for an order under Rule 37, and the trial court
never granted sanctions against AMC/Jeep for any discovery abuse.
None

of

the

evidence

excluded

by

the

trial

court

was

responsive to plaintiff's interrogatories for the simple reason
that none of this evidence related to the design and development
of the 1972 Commando.

In fact, as this Court observed in its

opinion, much of it was relevant only as rebuttal evidence on
issues improperly raised by plaintiffs' presentation of their casein-chief.

Certainly, plaintiffs have identified no interrogatory

and no statement by Judge

Sorenson which would

have

required

AMC/Jeep to produce the evidence subsequently excluded by the trial
court.
POINT IV
THE SUPREME COURT HAS APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD
OF REVIEW WITH RESPECT TO THE TRIAL COURT'S LIMITATION
OF THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANTS ' CROSS--EXAMINATION OF
PLAINTIFFS EXPERT WITNESSES

11
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Plaintiff argues that this Court has applied an inappropriate
standard of review with respect to the trial court's limitation of
the scope of defendants' cross-examination of plaintiff's expert
witnesses in this case, because (1) the Court has left the word
"clear" out of its statement of the "abuse of discretion" standard,
and (2) fails to define "abuse of discretion" in this particular
opinion.

Plaintiff's argument is utterly without merit.

The Court states in Part III of its opinion as follows:
Defendants next contend that the trial court erred
in limiting their cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert
witnesses. While unduly harsh limitation of a key expert
witness can amount to prejudicial error, the proper scope
of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of
the trial court and should not be disturbed absent a
showing of abuse. State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah
1978) ...
Slip Op. at 4.
On the face of the opinion, it is clear that the Court is
relying

upon

and directly

applying

articulated

in

the

"abuse

State

v.

of

discretion"

standard

previously

Starks,

and

its

progeny.

If that were not the case, the Court would have inserted

a contrary signal prior to the citation in the opinion.
More importantly, however, the language used by the Court
throughout the opinion in this case demonstrates that the Court
did, in fact, apply the correct standard of review on this issue.
In the paragraph immediately preceding the one attacked by the
plaintiff, the Court states as follows:
Given our standard of review of the admissibility
of evidence at trial, we cannot clearly say that the
trial
court
abused
its
discretion
in
admitting
plaintiffs' films in light of the foundation laid by
their experts...
12
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Slip Op. at 4.

Then in the midst of the section discussing the

propriety of the trial court , s limitation of defendant's crossexamination of plaintiff's experts, the Court says:
Contrary to the statement in the dissenting opinion, it is
clear that by inquiring as to his experience, defendants were
attempting to probe the expert's credibility and the
foundation for his testimony that it is difficult to roll a
passenger car.
Slip Op. at 6.
The Court has also defined the standard of review with respect
to the cross examination of expert witnesses as follows:
In Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978),
the Wyoming court held that it was prejudicial error to refuse
to allow cross-examination regarding a critical aspect of the
plaintiff's proof. There the court stated:
Having offered his expert opinion, the witness
exposes
himself
to
interrogation
which
ordinarily would have no place in the crossexamination of a factual witness, but the
expert exposes himself to the most searching
kind of investigation into his qualifications,
the extent of his knowledge and the reasons for
his opinion, including the facts and other
matters upon which it is based.
Id. at 1133.
Slip Op. at 4.
Finally, the Court concludes that:
An assertion or opinion given on direct testimony that
bears on a key issue in the case is a proper subject of
cross-examination. While the trial court's attempt to
avoid confusion of the issues and a long and cumbersome
trial is understandable, defendants were entitled to
conduct cross-examination into the basis of the opinions
offered by plaintiffs' expert witnesses and to probe the
comparisons they had made on direct examination.
Here defendants were repeatedly cut off during their
attempts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts.
The
numerous objections of plaintiffs' counsel, many of which
13
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were improperly sustained, prevented defendants from
probing the basis of opinions given by plaintiffs'
experts on comparisons they had made in their direct
examination. As a result, the issues were presented to
the jury without the added light that thorough crossexamination sheds.
We find therefore that the trial
court erred in limiting defendants' cross-examination of
plaintiffs' expert witnesses. The trial court did not
limit those experts to comparisons to utility vehicles
on their direct examination.
Hence cross-examination
should not have been so restricted.
Slip Op. at 6-7.
Plaintiff next argues that the comparisons made by its expert
witnesses in this case between Jeeps and other vehicles were not
really a critical aspect of the plaintiff's proof on the liability
issues.

Petition for Rehearing at 23.

demonstrates otherwise, however.

The Record in this case

As the Court notes:

In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced films of
Jeep CJ-5s rolling. In part I of this opinion, we upheld
the admissibility of those films because of the
[purported] substantial similarity of the vehicle shown
in the films to the vehicle in which plaintiffs were
injured. However, plaintiffs in presenting their case
did not stop there. They produced several experts who
repeatedly in their testimony drew comparisons of the
rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles to non-Jeep
vehicles. Plaintiffs' aim was to show that the Jeep in
which they were riding was of an unsafe design and had
a tendency to roll much easier than other vehicles. For
example, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Shaw, testified: "There
is no doubt that this vehicle is much more prone to roll
over than some others." Likewise, plaintiffs' expert,
Mr. Noettl, testified that " it was very difficult to
turn a passenger car over."
Finally, Mr. Anderson,
another of plaintiffs' experts, testified that Jeep
vehicles have "a delay in the handling response" that is
greater than S10 Blazers and Chevy Chevettes. Under the
rule of law relied upon by the dissenting opinion, that
evidence of the condition of other products is not
admissible to establish a defect in a particular product,
it may be questioned whether such comparisons should have
been admitted because of the lack of similarity.
However, right or wrong, plaintiffs' experts were allowed
to draw the comparisons between the rollover propensities
of Jeep and non-Jeep vehicles. Certainly, then,
14
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defendants should have been allowed in rebuttal to prove
the experience of plaintiffs' experts and to introduce
into evidence the film showing non-Jeep vehicles doing
mechanically induced rollovers similar to those shown in
plaintiffs' film...
Slip Op, at 9-10.
This

Court's

holding

that

the

trial

court

impermissibly

limited the scope of defendants' cross-examination of plaintiff's
expert witnesses, is also unassailable on the independent basis of
"curative admissibility", discussed in AMC/Jeep's opening brief on
this appeal.
Squibb,

682

See App. Br. at 44, n.5, and 50-53.
P.2d

832

(Utah

1984);

Mills

v.

Barnson v.

Memphis

Sales

Manufacturing Co., 251 F. Supp. 458, 460 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
POINT V
FINALLY, THIS COURT MUST REJECT PLAINTIFF'S NEW REQUEST
IN THE PETITION FOR REHEARING THAT THE REVERSAL OF THIS
CASE BE LIMITED TO THE LIABILITY ISSUES ONLY AND THAT THE
DAMAGE AWARD BE PERMITTED TO ACCRUE INTEREST PENDING
RETRIAL OF THE LIABILITY ISSUES
In Hvland v. St. Marias, 427 P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 1967), this
Court stated that
[t]here are undoubtedly some instances where limiting a
trial to the issue of damages only may be justified, as
our rules allow. But courts generally do not look with
favor upon such a restriction. The reasons why this is
so in personal injury actions are well exemplified in
this case. The questions relating to the plaintiff's
injury, how it happened, who was at fault, and the pain
and injury occasioned thereby, are so intermingled that
if there is to be a new trial, in fairness to both
parties it should be on all issues.
Similarly, in Groen v. Tri-0, 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983), this
Court determined that the new trial in a personal injury action
should be on liability and damages.

As here, one party claimed
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that because the jury had made a finding on the amount of damages,
only liability should be retried.

The Court stated in a footnote,

however, that "[w]hether such a finding should be reopened in
connection with a new trial on the issue of liability depends on
whether the two issues are so intermingled that fairness to both
parties requires retrial on both." Cf Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P. 2d
730, 735 (Utah 1982).

Without explanation the Court determined

that the retrial should involve damages as well as liability.

667

P.2d at 607, n. 11.
The Oregon Supreme C o u r t s decision in Maxwell v. Portland
Terminal RR Co., 456 P.2d 484, 486 (Or 1969) is also persuasive:
In the ordinary two-party personal-injury case, ...
evidence of fault can influence the jury's measurement
of damages; and the kind and degree of injuries may
influence some jurors in their evaluation of the evidence
on liability...Whatever logical problems these elements
of lawyer folklore may suggest, we believe that neither
side in this type of case should be encouraged to
manipulate errors in one trial to gain advantage in a new
trial before a new jury. Accordingly, we hold that the
new trial in a personal injury case ordinarily should be
a new trial on all contested factual issues, regardless
of the ability of the parties on appeal to pinpoint error
so as to show that the error, if any, may have affected
only one issue. There will, of course, be exceptional
cases in which the trial court, in the exercise of
judicial discretion, properly will limit the issues for
a new trial.
But the standard to be applied in the
exercise of this discretion is reasonable certainty that
the issue or issues to be eliminated from the second
trial are no longer viable issues in the case and that
their removal will not prejudice the right of either
party to the kind of jury trial to which he would have
been entitled but for the error or errors necessitating
the new trial.
And

the Colorado Supreme Court points

out

in Bassett v.

O'Dell, 498 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Colo 1972) that:
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[i]t is also clear that a partial retrial could not be
conducted without injustice, since it would be virtually
impossible under the facts of this case to mask the first
jury's verdict for the plaintiff from the new jury that
would be sitting at the time the case is retried. The
prejudicial inference that would be created by a limited
remand is to us obvious,
"A claim for damages arising out of a personal injury is
unliquidated in the sense that the defendant cannot know, prior to
judgment, the precise amount he is going to be required to pay.
Therefore, courts, in the absence of an applicable statute, apply
the general rule for unliquidated claims and do not allow interest
as a part of the damages awarded in such an action."

22 Am Jur 2d

Damages § 667.
In Utah, of course, "special damages" arising

in personal

injury actions accrue interest from the occurrence of the act
giving rise to a cause

of action, under

and pursuant

to the

provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision reversing and remanding this case for new
trial

is

correct.

Plaintiff's

Petition

for

Rehearing

must,

therefore, be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of April, 1989.
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS

by-^^^^f JK^#l*W64^
Patricia W. Christensen
Attorneys for Appellants
American Motors Sales Corporation
Jeep Corporation
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
Stephen Whitehead and
Deborah Whitehead,
Plaintiffs and Appellee,

No. 19695
F I L E D
February 2,

v.
American Motors Sales Corporation
and Jeep Corporation, Larry Anderson,
Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Company,
Defendants and Appellants.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock
Attorneys:

C. Keith Rooker, Patricia W. Christensen, Thomas
B. Green, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Jackson Howard, Richard B. Johnson, Provo,
for Appellee

HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
Defendants American Motors Sales Corporation and
Jeep Corporation (AMC/Jeep) appeal a judgment awarded
plaintiff Stephen Whitehead on a products licibility claim.
On October 16, 1979, Deborah Whitehead was driving
south on 1-15 near Orem, Utah, in a 1972 Jeep Commando that
she had borrowed from her father. Her husband, Stephen,
was riding in the passenger seat. Defendant Larry Anderson
was returning home from work in his automobile, a short
distance behind the Whiteheads. The Oldsmobile station
wagon he was driving was traveling approximately fifteen
miles per hour faster than the Commando. The Oldsmobile
struck the Commando on the left rear corner; the Commando
went out of control and rolled. Stephen Whitehead suffered
a spinal injury and was rendered a paraplegic.
Plaintiffs Deborah and Stephen Whitehead filed
their original complaint on November 21, 1979, naming
Anderson as defendant. The complaint was later amended,
adding Anderson's employer, Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Company, 1 and AMC and Jeep as defendants.
1^ Variable Annuity Life Insurance has filed a separate
appeal on the issue of vicarious liability. See Whitehead v.
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co,, No. 19645, decided also
today.
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During the nearly four years between the filing of
the original complaint and the beginning of trial, the
parties engaged in extensive discovery. Plaintiffs
propounded three sets of interrogatories to AMC/Jeep,
Their failure to timely answer the interrogatories brought
motions by plaintiffs to compel discovery. AMC/Jeep's
answers, when received, prompted a motion to strike as
unresponsive and additional motions to compel discovery by
plaintiffs. A hearing on those motions was held on
October 29, 1982, where Judge Sorensen2 went through the
interrogatories and answers. He modified some of the
questions, gave orders for supplemental answers to be
given, and stated that if the answers stood as given, he
would sustain objections to evidence not conforming with
the answers. Plaintiffs orally asked for sanctions against
AMC/Jeep for failure to cooperate in discovery. While no
formal motion was made and no order for sanctions was ever
issued, plaintiffs did file a motion in limine after the
supplemental answers were filed seeking to prohibit
AMC/Jeep from introducing evidence pertaining to the
subjects of certain interrogatories. The court reserved
ruling on the motion until the evidence was offered.
Plaintiffs also filed a motion in limine on
October 7, 1983, regarding the admissibility of a film
produced by Dynamic Science that showed Jeep CJ-5s rolling
over in staged tests. Upon a prescreeninng of the film and
over AMC/Jeep's objection, the judge ruled that the film
was admissible. Plaintiffs also moved to exclude all
evidence as to the availability and their nonuse of seat
belts. After reviewing memoranda of the parties and
proffers of proof, the court barred references to the
availability or nonuse of seat belts.
American Motors Sales Corporation filed its answer
to the complaint in September 1983, over three years after
being named in the amended complaint and just one month
prior to the trial* It raised Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1)
(1987) as a defense. This statute bars the bringing of a
products liability action "more than six years after the
date of initial purchase for use or consumption." Jeep
Corporation moved to amend its answer to also include this
defense; the motion was denied.
Trial commenced on October 19, 1983, and continued
for three weeks. The jury determined that AMC and Jeep
were negligent in the design of the vehicle and awarded
damages to Stephen Whitehead. AMC and Jeep appeal, raising
several issues which we will separately consider.
2~. Judge Sorensen, after hearing most of the pretrial
matters, retired and did not preside at the trial.
No. 19695
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I.
Defendants contend that they should have been
allowed to interpose a defense based on Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-15-3 (1987), which provides that product liability
actions are barred if brought "more than six years after the
initial purchase," In Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft,
717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), we held that statute to be
unconstitutional; therefore, defendants' point is moot*
II.
Defendants contend that the court erred in admitting
plaintiffs' films of Jeep CJ-5s. In reviewing questions of
admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the
trial court's advantageous position; thus, that court's
rulings regarding admissibility will not be overturned absent
an abuse of discretion. Bullock v> Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190,
192 (Utah 1975); Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418
(5th Cir. 1985) ; see also Collins v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 558
F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1977).
The criteria for establishing the admissibility of
crash test films, such as those in issue here, are that the
data be relevant, that the tests be conducted under conditions
substantially similar to those of the actual occurrence, and
that its presentation not consume undue amounts of time, not
confuse the issues, and not mislead the jury. Endicott v.
Nissan Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95
(1977) ; Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal.
App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1973); Jackson v. Fletcher,
647 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1981); Renfro Hosiery Mills Co. v.
United Cash Register Co., 552 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977); see
Weaver v. Ford Motor Co., 382 F. Supp. 1068 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
aff'd, 515 F.2d 506, 507 (3d Cir. 1975) (without published
opinion) ; see also Collins v. B.F. Goodrich, 558 F.2d at 910.
Defendants objected to admission of tests of GJ-5s
on the basis that the CJ-5 has a 20-inch shorter wheelbase,
giving it different steering and handling characteristics
than the Commando. Defendant also objected on grounds that
the tests were not substantially similar to the accident
conditions. The tests were "J turns" where 588 degrees of
steering were suddenly input while a constant vehicle speed
was maintained. The test vehicles had also been "specially
prepared" to accentuate the rollovers depicted in the films.
The requirement of "substantial similarity of conditions"
does not require absolute identity; however, they must "be so
nearly the same in substantial particulars as to afford a
fair comparison in respect to the particular issue to which
the test is directed." Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. Ishee,
317 So. 2d 923, 926 (Miss. 1975) (emphasis added). The films
here were offered to show the handling characteristics of the
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

No, 19695

)

)

Jeep Commando. Plaintiffs7 experts testified at length that
the handling characteristics of the CJ-5s shown in the tests
and the Commando were substantially similar. Defendants by
cross-examination and presentation of their own evidence
endeavored to bring out the differences between the test and
the accident and between the vehicle tested and the vehicle
in question.
Given our standard of review of the admissibility of
evidence at trial, we cannot clearly say that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting plaintiffs' films in light
of the foundation laid by their experts. As the trial court
stated in admitting the films, any differences between the
tests and the accident here would go to the weight the jury
would give the evidence. Jones v. Stemco Mfg. Co., 624 P.2d
1044, 1046 (Okla. 1981); see Lopez v. Allen, 96 Idaho 866,
871, 538 P.2d 1170, 1175 (1975).
III.
Defendants next contend that the trial court erred
in limiting their cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert
witnesses. While unduly harsh limitation of a key expert
witness can amount to prejudicial error, the proper scope of
cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and should not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse.
State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978); State v.
Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972); State v. Fox,
22 Utah 2d 211, 450 P.2d 987 (1969); N.V. Maatschappij v.
A.O. Smith Corp., 590 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1978). In
Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978), the
Wyoming court held that it was prejudical error to refuse to
allow cross-examination regarding a critical aspect of
plaintiff's proof. There the court stated:
Having offered his expert opinion, the
witness exposes himself to interrogation
which ordinarily would have no place in the
cross-examination of a factual witness, but
the expert exposes himself to the most
searching kind of investigation into his
qualifications, the extent of his knowledge
and the reasons for his opinion, including
the facts and other matters upon which it is
based*
Id. at 1133.
Defendants contend that there were several instances
where the trial court's limiting of cross-examination
prevented them from examining the basis of opinions offered by
plaintiffs' experts. In his direct testimony, plaintiffs'
expert, Mr. Anderson, testified that the Jeep Commando was
No. 19695
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defective because its track width was narrow and its center of
gravity high, making it easily susceptible to rollovers. He
also testified concerning the handling characteristics of
Blazers, Chevy Chevettes, and CJ-7s. On cross-examination, he
was asked:
Q:

Are there other vehicles that have the
same track width?

Mr. Howard [plaintiffs' counsel]: Object.
Repetitious and irrelevant.
Court: Sustained on the grounds it's
irrelevant.
Q:

Are there other vehicles that have about
the same center of gravity?

Mr. Howard:
Court:

Q:

It's irrelevant.

Sustained.

If you drive a three-quarter-ton pickup,
is it the same as driving a Honda
Accord; handling, steering?

Mr. Howard:
Court:

Q:

Objection.

Objection.

It's irrelevant.

Sustained.

. . . [T]ake another vehicle that has
wider track width and lower center of
gravity, can it be rolled on a level
surface with driver [steering] input?

Mr. Howard:
Court:

Objection.

It's irrelevant.

Sustained.

Defendants contend that not allowing them to cross-examine
Anderson with regard to characteristics of other vehicles and
how they would react under the conditions depicted in
plaintiffs' film left unchallenged the assertions that track
width and center of gravity are the essential characteristics
in determining a vehicle's rollover susceptibility and that
Jeeps are more dangerous than ''other vehicles" because their
track width is narrower and their center of gravity higher.
Mr. Anderson had been allowed to compare Jeeps with other
5
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vehicles, including the Chevy Chevette, which, contrary to the
thesis of the dissenting opinion, is not a utility vehicle.
Defendant should have been allowed to probe the comparisons
Anderson made.
In testifying for plaintiff, Mr. Noettl, another
expert witness, testified: "It was very difficult to turn a
passenger car over." On cross-examination, he was asked the
basis of this opinion.
Q:

What experience have you had in trying
to rollover [sic] a passenger vehicle?

Y

Mr. Johnson: Object on the basis of
relevancy.
Court: I don't want to get into testing all
other kinds of vehicles, because we've
got enough problems with the one. So,
I'm going to sustain the objection.
Contrary to the statement in the dissenting opinion, it is
clear that by inquiring as to his experience, defendants were
attempting to probe the expert's credibility and the
foundation for his testimony that it is difficult to roll a
passenger car.
On recross-examination, Mr. Noettl was also asked:
Q:

I think we were talking about what you
would expect to happen to the Commando
or any other vehicle that's hit under
the circumstances you have been
describing.

A: Yes.
Q:

And do you feel that any vehicle would
come out of that situation unscathed,
basically?

Plaintiffs objection to this question was also sustained.
An assertion or opinion given on direct testimony
that bears on a key issue in the case is a proper subject of
cross-examination. While the trial court's attempt to avoid
confusion of the issues and a long and cumbersome trial is
understandable, defendants were entitled to conduct crossexamination into the basis of the opinions offered by
plaintiffs' expert witnesses and to probe the comparisons they
had made on direct examination.
Here defendants were repeatedly cut off during their
attempts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts. The numerous
No. 19695
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objections of plaintiffs' counsel, many of which were
improperly sustained, prevented defendants from probing the
basis of opinions given by plaintiffs7 experts on comparisons
they had made in their direct examination. As a result, the
issues were presented to the jury without the added light that
thorough cross-examination sheds. We find therefore that the
trial court erred in limiting defendants7 cross-examination of
plaintiffs7 expert witnesses• The trial court did not limit
those experts to comparisons to utility vehicles on their
direct examination. Hence cross-examination should not have
been so restricted.
IV.
Defendants also contend that the trial court erred in
excluding certain films and exhibits offered by them as
evidence. They called a Mr. Heitzman as an expert witness to
testify regarding the handling characteristics of Jeep
vehicles. He offered a film showing CJ-5s successfully
negotiating emergency maneuvers. Plaintiffs objected on the
ground that the introduction of the film violated previous
orders of the court regarding discovery. The objection was
sustained.
Plaintiffs had submitted interrogatories seeking any
testing Jeep had done regarding the handling characteristics
of the 1966-73 Jeep Commando. At a hearing on plaintiffs7
motion to compel discovery, Judge Sorenson ordered Jeep to
respond to the interrogatory within thirty days. At trial,
after hearing arguments in chambers on the admissibility of
the film, the court ruled:
I think that in the context of all the
circumstances and with respect to discovery
procedures . . . I think the plaintiffs were
entitled to have, or see, the films and test
results before trial pursuant to their
discovery interrogatories . . . , the films
are not admissible.
The trial court can exclude evidence that violates discovery
orders under rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, defendants point out that the discovery covered only
tests of the 1966-73 Jeep Commando. The film offered was of a
Jeep CJ-5. The film simply is not covered by the language of
the interrogatory* Although plaintiffs7 experts were allowed
at trial, over objections of defendants, to show films of
CJ-5s based on their foundational testimony that its handling
was substantially similar to that of the Commando, that ruling
does not place the film within the scope of material sought in
the pretrial discovery request. The dissenting opinion would
have defendants divine the scope of the requests by a trial
court ruling on the admissibility of evidence which came much
7
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later. This burden cannot fairly be placed on them. The
tests were not produced to show the handling of the "66-73
Jeep Commando," nor were they offered for that purpose.
Defendants maintained that the handling of the GJ-5 and the
Commando were not the same. The tests were offered to rebut
evidence presented by plaintiffs that the GJ-5 was defective
because of its handling characteristics. Although this
evidence could have been excluded on the basis of relevancy
had the trial court earlier excluded plaintiffs' films^ once
the court allowed plaintiffs to try their case on the basis of
comparison with the GJ-5, it could not then refuse defendants
the opportunity to rebut assertions made by plaintiffs in the
presentation of their case. The trial court erred in
excluding the film on the basis that defendants had failed to
comply with orders regarding discovery.
^
Defendants offered a second film in conjunction with
Heitzman , s testimony. This film showed non-Jeep vehicles
doing mechanically induced rollovers similar to those shown in
plaintiffs 7 film. After excluding defendants' first film for
failure to produce it in discovery, the trial court ruled that
this second film was not admissible, stating:
Now, the other one rests on a different
principle, I think. And the question that I
have there is, the relevancy of it and
whatever else you might want to raise.
The evidence was offered to rebut the tests shown on
plaintiffs 7 films and to demonstrate that there was no design
defect in the Commando because virtually any vehicle would
roll when subjected to such tests.
We have no quarrel with the rule of law relied upon
in the dissenting opinion that "evidence of the condition of
other products is irrelevant and not admissible to establish a
defect in a particular product." This is a sound rule when
properly applied as it was in the cases cited in the
dissenting opinion. For example, in Clark v. Detroit &
Mackinac Ry., 197 Mich. 489, 163 N.W. 964 (1917), a rowboat
rented from the defendant capsized, causing four minors to
drown. The Michigan court held that it was error to attempt
to prove the unseaworthiness of the capsized boat by admitting
evidence of the various conditions of repair of the other
boats kept for hire by the defendant.
Similarly, in Detroit, T.& I. R.R. v. Banning, 173
F.2d 752 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 338 U.S. 815 (1949), also
cited in the dissenting opinion, the plaintiff, a railroad
brakeman, was injured while making a flying switch. He
brought suit against his employer railroad, contending that
the boxcar in which he was riding and which he was required to
slow down by applying a hand brake had been pushed too fast by
No. 19695
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the engine, making it impossible for him to adequately slow
down the boxcar, which was to couple with a standing car- At
trial, plaintiff was allowed to testify that although he had
previously made twenty-five to thirty flying switches, none of
them were made at a rate of speed as high as the one in which
he was injured. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that it was error to have admitted the plaintiff's
testimony. Said the court:
No foundation was laid to show the
circumstances, distance, grade or other
conditions of such previous operations.
We believe the testimony was improperly
admitted. Several factors can affect the
speed at the time of impact, variable
under different operations, irrespective
of the initial speed given to the free
rolling cars. It is a well-established
rule of evidence that circumstances under
which other comparable conduct occurs
should be substantially similar. Wigmore
on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. II, §§ 459, 460
[and citing other cases].
Banning, 173 F.2d at 756.
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced films of
Jeep CJ-5s rolling. In part I of this opinion, we upheld the
admissibility of those films because of the substantial
similarity of the vehicle shown in the films to the vehicle
in which plaintiffs were injured. However, plaintiffs in
presenting their case did not stop there. They produced
several experts who repeatedly in their testimony drew
comparisons of the rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles to
non-Jeep vehicles. Plaintiffs' aim was to show that the Jeep
in which they were riding was of an unsafe design and had a
tendency to roll much easier than other vehicles. For
example, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Shaw, testified: "There is
no doubt that this vehicle is much more prone to roll over
than some others." Likewise, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Noettl,
testified that "it was very difficult to turn a passenger car
over." Finally, Mr. Anderson, another of plaintiffs'
experts, testified that Jeep vehicles have "a delay in the
handling response" that is greater than S10 Blazers and Chevy
Chevettes. Under the rule of law relied upon by the
dissenting opinion, that evidence of the condition of other
products is not admissible to establish a defect in a
particular product, it may be questioned whether such
comparisons should have been admitted because of the lack of
similarity. However, right or wrong, plaintiffs' experts
were allowed to draw the comparisons between the rollover
propensities of Jeep and non-Jeep vehicles. Certainly then,
defendants should have been allowed in rebuttal to prove the
9
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experience of plaintiffs' experts and to introduce into
evidence the film showing non-Jeep vehicles doing
mechanically induced rollovers similar to those shown in
plaintiffs' film. This situation is wholly different from
the situations in the two above cases relied upon in the
dissenting opinion where the plaintiff was not allowed to
make comparisons when the circumstances were dissimilar.
The third film that defendants claim was wrongfully
excluded was offered as exhibit No. 174, a video produced by
defendants' expert, Dr. Warner. It consisted of two parts:
the first showed a 1972 Jeep Commando conducting a drivethrough of the accident scene, and the second showed the same
vehicle with outriggers attached doing maneuvers in a parking
lot. The trial court ruled that the first part of the film
was not probative of any issue. We agree. The second part
was excluded because the test was not made until after the
trial had commenced, in violation of pretrial orders
regarding discovery. Counsel for defendants stated that
No. 174 was offered to show the handling characteristics of
the 1972 Commando. Clearly, it came within the scope of
plaintiffs' interrogatories and was properly excluded for
failure to respond to discovery.
In conjunction with exhibit No. 174, the trial court
viewed a film of a 1970 Ford in a rollover test (exhibit
No. 175). Defendants offered No. 175 to demonstrate the
movement of vehicle occupants during a rollover. The trial
court determined that the film was not probative and excluded
it. The film was dissimilar to the accident, was not
necessary to rebut amy evidence offered by plaintiffs, and
was not probative of any disputed issue. There was therefore
no error in the exclusion of defendants' exhibit No. 175.
Defendants' expert, Dr. Warner, offered exhibit
No. 130, a storyboard, to illustrate his testimony that the
vehicle in question had been involved in a prior accident
that compromised the structural integrity of the roof.
Plaintiffs' counsel objected, claiming that the exhibit was
not material. The trial court sustained the objection.
Plaintiffs' experts had testified that the roof of the
vehicle was defectively designed, thus contributing to
plaintiffs' injuries. Evidence illustrating how the roof had
been damaged in a prior accident was relevant to rebut this
assertion. The trial court erred in sustaining plaintiffs'
objection to exhibit No. 130.
Defendants also offered exhibit No. 164, a series of
five photographs showing live models posed in a static
vehicle to represent passenger movement in a rollover. This
was offered to illustrate the testimony of Dr. Warner that
the movement of the passengers, not the design of the
vehicle, caused the injuries. The trial court initially
No. 19695
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admitted and then excluded the exhibit, stating:
The probative value is limited at least
because of the photographs not being
representative of just what did happen to
the vehicles . . • or the people in them.
While it is not clear whether the basis of the trial court's
ruling was relevance, Utah R. Evid. 401, or that the probative
value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, etc., Utah R. Evid. 403, we will
uphold the trial court's ruling where there is any valid basis
to do so. State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986).
Here the trial court could have properly excluded the evidence
under either theory; therefore, we find no error in the
exclusion of exhibit No. 164.
-- V.
Defendants also contend that the trial court erred in
excluding all references to the availability of seatbelts and
plaintiffs7 failure to use them. Plaintiffs made a motion in
limine to exclude all evidence of seatbelts. The trial court
excluded such evidence, stating:
[T]o speculate what the seatbelt might have
done in this type of situation is just
something that the jury ought not to, and
they will not have, under my ruling, the
obligation to consider. . . .
I want no
more evidence in this case with regard to
seatbelts.
Defendants contend that the evidence of seatbelts was relevant
and necessary to show (1) that their presence was a factor the
jury should consider when determining if the vehicle was
unsafe as designed, and (2) that plaintiffs' injuries could
have been prevented or lessened by the use of seatbelts and
therefore the jury should be allowed to determine whether
plaintiffs' duty of ordinary care or their duty to mitigate
damages required them to wear seatbelts.
We agree that evidence of how the presence of
seatbelts affected the design safety of the vehicle should be
admitted. However, the bulk of defendants' proffered evidence
and the main thrust of their argument regarding seatbelts was
directed at plaintiffs' failure to use them as constituting
contributory negligence or failure to mitigate damages. The
majority of the cases cited in the briefs submitted to this
Court have rejected this approach. See Kopischke v. First
Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980) (for
citations to other jurisdictions which have rejected this
11
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approach) • More persuasively, the legislature has passed Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-186 (1988), which provides:
The failure to wear a seat belt does not
constitute contributory or comparative
negligence and may not be introduced as
evidence in any civil litigation on the
issue of injuries or on the issue of
mitigation of damages.
Although this statute was passed subsequent to the litigation
sub judice and was therefore not controlling at trial, we
nonetheless decline to place ourselves in the awkward position
of adopting a stance that is in direct contravention of
express legislation. We therefore find that the trial court
did not err in excluding evidence that the failure to use
seatbelts constituted contributory negligence or failure to
mitigate damages.
VI.
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that
error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected. In the instant case, the trial court erroneously
excluded evidence offered by defendants. That evidence was
necessary to rebut the assertions that plaintiffs made to
establish liability. This error was compounded by unduly
restricting the scope of defendants' cross-examination. Given
the conflicting testimony presented on this key issue, we
cannot say that the substantial rights of defendants were not
affected by the combined effects of the erroneous exclusion of
the evidence and the limitation of cross-examination. While
no one error by itself perhaps mandates reversal, the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our
confidence that defendants were able to present to the jury
their theory of the case and that a fair trial was had.
"W^therefore^ireverse" a:hdfr^and^for^a^new^trial^

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice

No. 19695

12 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

/

STEWART, Justice:

(Dissenting)

After a two- and one-half-week trial which produced
some 5,000 pages of transcript, a verdict was returned for
plaintiff Stephen Whitehead for damages produced by the tragic
and permanent injuries suffered in the rollover of a Jeep
Commando. The Court reverses the jury verdict and judgment on
the basis of a few evidentiary rulings culled from a host of
such rulings. The Court holds that the trial court erred in
(1) limiting defendants' cross-examination, and (2) excluding
defendants' films. I submit that the trial court was clearly
correct and that, in any event, the rulings fall within a
trial judge's discretion. For these reasons, I dissent.
I.

LIMITATIONS OF DEFENDANTS' CROSS-EXAMINATION

The majority holds that the trial court improperly
limited defendants' cross-examination of plaintiffs' experts.
The majority cites three instances in which the trial court
"cut off" defendants' attempts to cross-examine plaintiffs'
experts and which prevented defendants from probing the basis
of opinions given by plaintiffs' experts.
This Court has long held that the trial court has
considerable discretion in determining whether evidence is
relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976).
The judgment of the trial court in admitting or excluding
evidence should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion,
and only when the error is prejudicial. State v. Miller, 727
P.2d 203 (Utah 1986); State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah
1985); Terry v. Zion's Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 1979). Generally, evidence of the condition of other
products is irrelevant and not admissible to establish a
defect in a particular product. See Detroit, T. & I. R.R. v.
Banning, 173 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir.)/ cert, denied, 338 U.S.
815 (1949); Clark v. Detroit & M. Ry», 197 Mich. 489, 503, 163
N.W. 964, 968 (1917); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 302, at 348
(1967); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 583, at 712 (1964). Thus, it is
irrelevant whether the Jeep Commando was unreasonably
dangerous compared with other makes or models of automobiles
generally. The only relevant inquiry is the turnover
characteristics of the Jeep Commando and other vehicles
substantially similar to it. 1
1. The majority opinion concedes that only films showing
accidents of a similar nature are admissible and that the
trial court correctly excluded one of defendants' films on
this basis. However, the majority appears to reject the
proposition that the scope of both direct and
cross-examination may be properly limited to similar
vehicles.
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

No. 19695

}

In this case, the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion by ruling that the scope of cross-examination would
include only comparisons of vehicles with the same or similar
characteristics as the Jeep Commando. The court, during the
course of the trial, reminded defendants' counsel that only
evidence of similar vehicles would be admitted:
The Court: I don't think I've prohibited
any kind of cross examination with
reference to vehicles that had the
same or similar characteristics;
to-wit: center of gravity and wheel
width, that Jeep has.
Mr. Mandlebaum [attorney for defendant
AMC/Jeep]: Well, I may be
incorrect. But I believe you have,
your Honor. I thought the Court's
ruling was that we could not compare
other vehicles.
The Court: No. The only ruling that I
have made with regard to that, at
least, at least that's my intent, was
that unless the vehicles were
similar, that I wasn't going to
permit you to compare them in order
to show that other vehicles might be
as dangerous as this vehicle.
The majority now holds that the trial court's
limitations on cross-examination interfered with defendants'
ability to attack the foundation of the opinions of
plaintiffs' expert witnesses. Defendant was allowed, however,
to introduce such evidence when it was intended to go to
credibility, as shown below.
The majority cites three examples of the trial
court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's cross-examination. The
examples cited do not prove that there was a limitation of
cross-examination as to any "critical aspect of plaintiffs'
proof." In light of the trial court's ruling that only
evidence of vehicles with the same or substantially similar
characteristics would be admissible, evidence of other
non-similar types of vehicles was inadmissible absent some
special relevancy.
Every ruling criticized by the majority was in fact
required by the court's pretrial ruling, yet the majority does
not even discuss the validity of that ruling. Indeed, the
majority's view of this case would allow defendants to delve
into the rollover characteristics of every single type of
four-wheeled passenger vehicle on the road. Such a ruling
No. 19695
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would have made it virtually impossible to try this case* It
is, of course, self-evident that all four-wheeled vehicles can
be rolled over. Whether a vehicle is defectively designed
depends upon whether the vehicle is dangerous when used under
the ordinary conditions of its intended use. That should be
determined by examining vehicles that are designed for similar
purposes, i.e., utility vehicles in this case, as the trial
judge ruled. In my view, the majority undermines the trial
judge's ability to manage a case such as this by permitting
defendant to explore on cross-examination matters of highly
attenuated relevancy.
The majority's first example of limitation of
cross-examination arises out of plaintiffs' expert's testimony
on direct examination concerning the "handling characteristics
of Blazers, Chevy Chevettes, and CJ-7S." On direct
examination, the expert stated:
Q:

And what type of handling and
maneuvering tests did you perform
last week?

A:

Well, I had some instrument tests
that I performed on four different
vehicles. I had a CJ-5, a CJ-7, a
small Blazer, the new F10 [sic] size
Blazer, and the Chevy Chevette.

Q:

And what did the results show in
regard to your tests on the Jeep
itself?

A:

Well, all the results are
preliminary. I don't have all the
data reduced yet. But my preliminary
quick look at that data indicates
that the Jeep vehicles both overturn
at speeds of 20 to 25 miles an hour,
and they both have a delay in the
handling response that's in the
magnitude of a half a second before
the vehicle is stabilized to turn.
The other vehicles I tested, the S10
Blazer and the Chevy Chevette, they
did not have delays of that
magnitude. They were much less.

The majority cites the following, which occurred in the
context of the above testimony, as a limitation of
cross-examination:

15
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•

•
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Are there other vehicles that have
the same track width—

Mr, Howard [plaintiffs' counsel]:
Object. Repetitious and irrelevant*
Court: Sustained on the grounds it's
irrelevant.
Q:

Are there other vehicles that have
about the same center of gravity?

Mr. Howard:
Court:

Q:

It's irrelevant.

Sustained.

If you drive a three-quarter-ton
pickup, is it the same as driving a
Honda Accord; handling, steering?

Mr. Howard:
Court:

Q:

Objection.

Objection.

It's irrelevant.

Sustained.

[T]ake another vehicle that has wider
track width and lower [center of
gravity], can it be rolled on a level
surface with driver [steering]
input?

Mr. Howard:
Court:

Objection.

It's irrelevant.

Sustained.

Defendants' attempted cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert
went far beyond the scope of the trial judge's order limiting
the evidence and also beyond the scope of direct examination.
There was no testimony on direct concerning the rollover
propensities, track width, or center of gravity of "other
vehicles" in general. The only testimony given on direct
examination related to the "handling response" time of the
CJ-5, CJ-7, S10 Blazer, and Chevy Chevette, all of which are
utility vehicles having general characteristics substantially
similar to the Jeep Commando. I submit that the trial court
did not err in limiting cross-examination.
The second example cited by the majority of improper
limitation of cross-examination occurred in the following

No. 19695

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

)

;

exchange on defendants' cross-examination of plaintiffs'
expert:
Q:

What experience have you had in
trying to roll over a passenger
vehicle?

Mr*

Johnson [plaintiffs' counsel]:
Object on the basis of relevancy.

Court: I don't want to get into testing
all other kinds of vehicles, because
we've got enough problems with the
one. So, I'm going to sustain the
objection.
The cross-examination question above was based on an
assumption made by plaintiffs' expert and found in the
following direct examination:
Q:

When you started out with this
particular test, did you know exactly
what speeds and what input it would
take to turn the CJ-5 over?

A:

No, absolutely. It was just the
opposite. That the belief was, that
since it was very difficult to turn a
passenger car over, especially on a
flat surface at low speeds, that it
would be difficult to do this with a
Jeep, too.

As is evident from the above, plaintiffs' expert did not
purport to have experience in testing or researching the
rollover propensities of "passenger c a r s / nor did he claim to
have experience in rolling vehicles other than the CJ-5. He
clearly stated that he started with the belief that since it
was difficult to roll a passenger car, it would also be
difficult to roll a CJ-5. The testimony on direct examination
only made passing reference to "passenger cars." The focus of
the examination clearly was not on the rollover propensity of
passenger cars, and the trial judge was clearly within the
ambit of reasonable discretion in sustaining the objection on
cross-examination.
Nevertheless, after sustaining the objection as to
"passenger cars," the court allowed defendant AMC to
cross-examine about "utility vehicles" because of their
substantial similarity to the CJ-5 and the Jeep Commando:
Mr. Jensen [attorney for defendants]:
What about the vehicles similar to
17
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the CJ-5; that is utility vehicles?
The Scout, Landcruiser, and that
class of vehicles? The small
pickups, narrow and with equivalent
center of gravity?
Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs/ counsel]:
Object on the basis of relevance and
foundation. Outside the scope of
direct.
The Court:

What is the relevance?

Mr. Jensen:
Honor.

Similar vehicles, Your

The Court:

The same width, the same

—

Mr. Jensen: Similar track width and
center of gravity.
The Court:

You may answer.

Thus, there was no limitation on cross-examination about
substantially similar vehicles.
The majority's third example of an improper
limitation of cross-examination, if read in context, reveals
that the judge sustained an objection that went only to the
form of the question. Since a question that is barred because
of its form may always be rephrased, and since defendants'
question was not rephrased, it simply is not true that the
trial court limited cross-examination in this instance. In
the following testimony, the focus of cross-examination was on
a direct, straight-on rear-end collision to a vehicle without
any lateral forces:
Q:

So would you expect that vehicle to
stay on the road?

At

Again, under a hypothetical thing
where you just have an impact from
the rear, no lateral forces are put
in, yes, it will stay right on the
road.

Q:

No problem at all staying on the
road?

A:

No problem at all.

Q:

The driver just rides it out and no
problem?

No. 19695
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A:

Under those conditions I described,
yes. If you have no lateral forces
acting on the vehicle, [no] side
forces, the vehicle isn't going to
turn over,

Q:

All right. That would apply whether
it's a Commando or some other
vehicle?

A:

In my opinion, that's correct.

Q:

All right. And what distance would
it take for a driver to get that
vehicle under control, and could he
do it within the width of three lanes
of the freeway?

Mr. Johnson: Outside the scope, Your
Honor. We object to it. Secondly,
the facts of this case are clearly
lateral force. The evidence at this
point is uncontroverted that six
inches, the Oldsmobile hit six inches
of the Jeep on a specific corner. We
don't have a direct back input.
The Court: I'm going to take an afternoon
recess at this time. I'll overrule
your objection with respect to it not
being within the scope of the direct
examination. But I will sustain it
with regard to the form of the
question. And when we come back you
may go from there.

Q [By Mr. Jensen]:
Honor.

Thank you, Your

I think we were talking about what
you would expect to happen to the
Commando or any vehicle that's hit
under the circumstances that you have
been describing?
A:

Yes.

Q:

And do you feel like any vehicle
would come out of that situation
unscathed, basically?
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Mr- Johnson: Your Honor, the Court
sustained the objection as to the
form of the question.
The Court: And I'll sustain the objection
to that question.
Besides asking about the effect of a direct rear impact
without lateral forces, the question was ambiguous and too
broad and, at the least, should have been restated. The trial
court acted well within its discretion, and in any event, the
incident is unimportant to the outcome of the trial.
In fact, full cross-examination of plaintiffs'
experts' qualifications and experience was allowed.2 For
example, Mr. Jensen, counsel for AMC/Jeep, cross-examined
Mr. Noettl, plaintiffs' expert, on his knowledge of vehicle
rollover literature. Mr. Noettl identified various tests,
reports, and studies concerning vehicle rollover thresholds
and vehicle characteristics. Overruling plaintiffs' objection
to a question concerning the rollover propensity of big
trucks, the court stated:
Overruled.

It may or may not be.

I have

2. On a related point, the majority accepts AMC's contention
that
not allowing them to cross-examine
Anderson with regard to characteristics of
other vehicles and how they would react
under the conditions depicted in
plaintiffs' film left unchallenged the
assertions that track width and center of
gravity were the essential characteristics
in determining a vehicle's rollover
susceptibility and that Jeeps were more
dangerous than other vehicles because
their track width was narrower and their
center of gravity higher.
That is not correct. Defendants elicited such evidence from
its own expert witness, Edward Heitzman. Heitzman testified
at length concerning the factors that determine the
susceptibility to rollover of vehicles in general. Heitzman
testified about numerous other vehicles (including both
utility vehicles and passenger cars) which have a center of
gravity equal to or higher than the Jeep Commando. Heitzman
also testified extensively about the static stability ratio,
which was relied on by plaintiffs' experts, to determine a
vehicle's propensity to roll over. In fact, Heitzman had a
list of vehicles with their static stability ratios which
formed the basis for his testimony regarding the comparison of
the Jeep with other vehicles. After extensive discussion, the
list itself was admitted into evidence.
No. 19695
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not changed my ruling with respect to
other matters, in permitting him to go
into this* This may have something to do
with credibility, veracity, accuracy, or
whatever.
The cross-examination of Mr. Anderson, another of plaintiffs'
experts, also demonstrates that defendants were not prevented
from questioning an expert about his experience and
qualifications.
This Court has ruled that counsel should make clear
to the trial judge the relevance of cross-examination
questions when an objection is sustained on relevancy
grounds. State v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1986). See
also State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986). In none
of the present instances where the majority rules that the
trial court improperly sustained plaintiffs' objections to
questions regarding other vehicles did defense counsel state
the relevance of those questions. Absent an explanation of
the relevance of the line of inquiry, exclusion was properly
called for under the pretrial ruling, which certainly was
within the discretion of the court. If, indeed, the point was
to attack the foundation of the expert's opinion—and not to
confuse the substantive issue of determining whether the
Commando was defective—that should have been explained to the
trial court. Otherwise, the trial court was certainly
entitled to assume that defendants sought to circumvent the
judge's ruling on relevancy.
II.

EXCLUSION OF FILMS

The trial court's decision to
test films was also clearly within its
portrayed non-Jeep vehicles performing
rollovers in a manner somewhat similar
plaintiffs' film. The court ruled:

exclude defendants'
discretion. One film
mechanically induced
to those shown in

[I]t's irrelevant, and it's irrelevant
because they involve other vehicles which
the jury would have to take into
consideration as to how it was done, the
comparisons, the whole works.

And the other witnesses have seen the
Jeep film. And I've let him testify with
regard to his version of those tests with
regard to the Jeep. I kept out the other
because I thought they were irrelevant on
the issue as to whether or not the Jeep
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was defectively designed, and I still
think it is.

Because each of those tests are —
they have a — they're not all exactly the
same. You don't even have the same
vehicle. And we'd have to determine the
reliability of the tests for each
individual car or automobile. And I'm not
going to let the jury do that.
Defendants argued before the trial court that plaintiffs had
at least three different tests or films in evidence showing
different vehicles making different maneuvers/ all of which
involved different steering inputs at different speeds. The
judge responded that those tests and films were admitted
because expert testimony established that the vehicles
depicted in the films were substantially the same as the Jeep
Commando involved in this case:
The Court: That's the only reason. The
rest of them were out. And I'm going to
keep them all out.
The majority holds that because plaintiffs' experts
were allowed to draw the comparisons between the rollover
propensities of Jeep and non-Jeep vehicles, defendants should
also have been allowed to introduce a film of non-Jeep
vehicles doing mechanically induced rollovers. As stated
earlier, evidence of the condition of other products is
generally not admissible to prove a defect in a particular
product. See Banning, 173 F.2d at 756; Clark, 197 Mich, at
503, 163 N.W. at 968; 29 Am. Jur. Evidence § 302; 32 C.J.S.
Evidence § 583. Such evidence is admissible, however, when
the products are substantially similar. There is no evidence
that defendants' film showed vehicles which were substantially
similar. Plaintiffs' film, however, was of vehicles
substantially similar to the Jeep Commando.
In addition, the majority rules that the trial court
erred in excluding defendants' film of a Jeep CJ-5 on the
basis that it violated a discovery order directing defendants
to answer an interrogatory that would have disclosed the
existence of the film. The majority states: "[Djefendants
point out that the discovery covered only tests of the 1966-73
Jeep Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep CJ-5. The film
simply is not covered by the language of the interrogatory.''
I submit the majority is simply in error in stating that the
interrogatory did not cover the film. The interrogatory
directed defendants to "state whether Jeep Corporation or
Kaiser Jeep Corporation tested for or otherwise determined the
No. 19695
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handling characteristics and qualities of said automobiles
[Commandos] both during the development and subsequently to
the initial production • . . ."
The interrogatory specifically requested information
as to all tests, even those subsequent to production, to
determine the handling characteristics and qualities of the
Commando. Defendants7 tests of the Jeep CJ-5 were, in fact,
used to determine the handling characteristics and qualities
of the Jeep Commando, contrary to the assertion of the
majority that the films were not offered for the purpose of
showing the handling of the '66-73 Commando. The CJ-5 was
shown by foundational testimony to be substantially similar to
the Jeep Commando. A vehicle is substantially similar only if
it has substantially the same characteristics and qualities.
The interrogatory requested information concerning not only
the subsequent testing of Commandos, but also the testing for,
or otherwise determining, the characteristics or qualities of
the Commando. Such testing included the CJ-5 because it had
many of the same characteristics and qualities of a Commando.
Otherwise, the CJ-5 film would have been irrelevant to
defendants7 case and inadmissible.3
The majority claims, however, that defendants were
forced to "divine the scope of the requests by a trial court
ruling on the admissibility of evidence which came much
later." Defendants were instructed, weeks before trial, that
they could cross-examine but were "not to bring up new facts
which were not given plaintiffs7 counsel in their response to
interrogatories." Given the purpose of submitting the CJ-5
film—to show the characteristics of the Commando—defendants
had prior notice and should not be able to influence the
outcome of this long and difficult case by surprise. The
tests of the CJ-5 clearly fell within the scope of the
interrogatory in question. The trial court properly excluded
the test film on the ground that defendants failed to comply
with discovery orders based on that interrogatory. See
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1284-85

(Wyo. 1983) (exclusion of defendants7 rollover film for
violation of discovery order was within broad discretion of
trial court).
Finally, the majority opinion states that it was
improper for the trial court to exclude exhibit No. 130, a
storyboard illustrating defendants7 expert7s testimony "that
the vehicle in question had been involved in a prior accident
that compromised the structural integrity of the roof." This
3. Defendants claim now on appeal that "[i]t was a film made
in 1983 of a Jeep CJ-5 and had nothing to do with the 1972
Commando." (Emphasis in original.) If that is true, we
should affirm the trial court7s order on grounds of
irrelevancy.
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question goes more to damages rather than liability. Its
admissibility turned on a whole host of variables.
Determination of admissibility is in the trial judge's
discretion.
Durham, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Stewart.
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